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Résumé

Theoretical models on autocracies have long grappled with how to characterize and analyze state sponsorship of repression. Moreover, much of the existing formal literature sees dictators’ behavior as determined by one type of opposition actor alone and disregards the potential role played by other types of actors. We develop a contest model of political survival with a ruler, the elite and the opposition, and show how the ruler needs to respond to revolutionary pressures while securing the allegiance of his own supportive coalition. We find that the ruler’s reliance on vertical and horizontal repression is antithetically affected by the country’s wealth and the optimal bundle of vertical and horizontal repression has important consequences for the regime’s political vulnerability. Our hypothesis about the impact of wealth on repression is strongly borne out by the empirical results, which are robust to endogeneity concerns.
langue originaleAnglais
Pages (de - à)410-428
Nombre de pages19
journalJournal of Comparative Economics
étatPublié - 2018

Empreinte digitale

Wealth
Empirical results
Sponsorship
Elites
Dictator
Political regime
Vulnerability
Endogeneity
Contests

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title = "Political repression in autocratic regimes",
abstract = "Theoretical models on autocracies have long grappled with how to characterize and analyze state sponsorship of repression. Moreover, much of the existing formal literature sees dictators’ behavior as determined by one type of opposition actor alone and disregards the potential role played by other types of actors. We develop a contest model of political survival with a ruler, the elite and the opposition, and show how the ruler needs to respond to revolutionary pressures while securing the allegiance of his own supportive coalition. We find that the ruler’s reliance on vertical and horizontal repression is antithetically affected by the country’s wealth and the optimal bundle of vertical and horizontal repression has important consequences for the regime’s political vulnerability. Our hypothesis about the impact of wealth on repression is strongly borne out by the empirical results, which are robust to endogeneity concerns.",
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author = "Jean-Philippe Platteau and Petros Sekeris and Vincenzo Bove",
year = "2018",
language = "English",
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journal = "Journal of Comparative Economics",
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Political repression in autocratic regimes. / Platteau, Jean-Philippe; Sekeris, Petros; Bove, Vincenzo.

Dans: Journal of Comparative Economics, 2018, p. 410-428.

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal/une revueArticle

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T1 - Political repression in autocratic regimes

AU - Platteau, Jean-Philippe

AU - Sekeris, Petros

AU - Bove, Vincenzo

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - Theoretical models on autocracies have long grappled with how to characterize and analyze state sponsorship of repression. Moreover, much of the existing formal literature sees dictators’ behavior as determined by one type of opposition actor alone and disregards the potential role played by other types of actors. We develop a contest model of political survival with a ruler, the elite and the opposition, and show how the ruler needs to respond to revolutionary pressures while securing the allegiance of his own supportive coalition. We find that the ruler’s reliance on vertical and horizontal repression is antithetically affected by the country’s wealth and the optimal bundle of vertical and horizontal repression has important consequences for the regime’s political vulnerability. Our hypothesis about the impact of wealth on repression is strongly borne out by the empirical results, which are robust to endogeneity concerns.

AB - Theoretical models on autocracies have long grappled with how to characterize and analyze state sponsorship of repression. Moreover, much of the existing formal literature sees dictators’ behavior as determined by one type of opposition actor alone and disregards the potential role played by other types of actors. We develop a contest model of political survival with a ruler, the elite and the opposition, and show how the ruler needs to respond to revolutionary pressures while securing the allegiance of his own supportive coalition. We find that the ruler’s reliance on vertical and horizontal repression is antithetically affected by the country’s wealth and the optimal bundle of vertical and horizontal repression has important consequences for the regime’s political vulnerability. Our hypothesis about the impact of wealth on repression is strongly borne out by the empirical results, which are robust to endogeneity concerns.

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KW - repression

KW - natural resources

M3 - Article

SP - 410

EP - 428

JO - Journal of Comparative Economics

JF - Journal of Comparative Economics

SN - 0147-5967

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