On monopolistic competition and optimal product diversity: Workers' rents also matter

P.M. Picard, E. Toulemonde

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal/une revueArticle

Résumé

In the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, entry of firms is socially too small. Other authors have shown that excess entry is also a possibility with other preferences for diversity. We show that workers' rents also contribute to explain excess entry through a general equilibrium mechanism. Larger wages indeed raises the aggregate earnings and firms sales and profits, which entices too many firms to enter. We discuss the possibility of over-provision of varieties by comparing the equilibrium to unconstrained and constrained social optima and to other regulatory frameworks where wages are not controlled. © Canadian Economics Association.
langue originaleAnglais
Pages (de - à)1347-1360
Nombre de pages14
journalCanadian Journal of Economics
Volume42
Les DOIs
étatPublié - 1 nov. 2009

Empreinte digitale

Workers
Monopolistic competition
Rent
Product diversity
Excess entry
Wages
Profit
General equilibrium
Regulatory framework
Social optimum

Citer ceci

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On monopolistic competition and optimal product diversity : Workers' rents also matter. / Picard, P.M.; Toulemonde, E.

Dans: Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol 42, 01.11.2009, p. 1347-1360.

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal/une revueArticle

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