Efficient Bargaining with Underutilization of Labor

P. Dehez, D. De La Croix, E. Toulemonde

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    Résumé

    The standard efficient contract involving a monopolistic firm and a union has always been derived under the assumption that the firm operates efficiently, i.e., it fully uses its labor force. However, nothing constrains the firm to do so and production with underutilization of labor may occur. The implications of ignoring that possibility and the conditions under which underutilization effectively occurs are studied in this paper.
    langue originaleAnglais
    Pages (de - à)127-139
    Nombre de pages13
    journalJournal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie
    Volume69
    Etat de la publicationPublié - 1 janv. 1999

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