Efficient Bargaining with Underutilization of Labor

P. Dehez, D. De La Croix, E. Toulemonde

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal/une revueArticle

Résumé

The standard efficient contract involving a monopolistic firm and a union has always been derived under the assumption that the firm operates efficiently, i.e., it fully uses its labor force. However, nothing constrains the firm to do so and production with underutilization of labor may occur. The implications of ignoring that possibility and the conditions under which underutilization effectively occurs are studied in this paper.
langue originaleAnglais
Pages (de - à)127-139
Nombre de pages13
journalJournal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie
Volume69
étatPublié - 1 janv. 1999

Empreinte digitale

Labor
Labor force
Efficient contract

Citer ceci

@article{92831e65b8f0425fa17ad36f86c0600f,
title = "Efficient Bargaining with Underutilization of Labor",
abstract = "The standard efficient contract involving a monopolistic firm and a union has always been derived under the assumption that the firm operates efficiently, i.e., it fully uses its labor force. However, nothing constrains the firm to do so and production with underutilization of labor may occur. The implications of ignoring that possibility and the conditions under which underutilization effectively occurs are studied in this paper.",
author = "P. Dehez and {De La Croix}, D. and E. Toulemonde",
note = "Copyright 2004 Elsevier Science B.V., Amsterdam. All rights reserved.",
year = "1999",
month = "1",
day = "1",
language = "English",
volume = "69",
pages = "127--139",
journal = "Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie",
issn = "0931-8658",
publisher = "Springer Wien",

}

Efficient Bargaining with Underutilization of Labor. / Dehez, P.; De La Croix, D.; Toulemonde, E.

Dans: Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, Vol 69, 01.01.1999, p. 127-139.

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal/une revueArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - Efficient Bargaining with Underutilization of Labor

AU - Dehez, P.

AU - De La Croix, D.

AU - Toulemonde, E.

N1 - Copyright 2004 Elsevier Science B.V., Amsterdam. All rights reserved.

PY - 1999/1/1

Y1 - 1999/1/1

N2 - The standard efficient contract involving a monopolistic firm and a union has always been derived under the assumption that the firm operates efficiently, i.e., it fully uses its labor force. However, nothing constrains the firm to do so and production with underutilization of labor may occur. The implications of ignoring that possibility and the conditions under which underutilization effectively occurs are studied in this paper.

AB - The standard efficient contract involving a monopolistic firm and a union has always been derived under the assumption that the firm operates efficiently, i.e., it fully uses its labor force. However, nothing constrains the firm to do so and production with underutilization of labor may occur. The implications of ignoring that possibility and the conditions under which underutilization effectively occurs are studied in this paper.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0346405352&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Article

VL - 69

SP - 127

EP - 139

JO - Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie

JF - Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie

SN - 0931-8658

ER -