Efficient Bargaining with Underutilization of Labor

P. Dehez; D. De La Croix; E. Toulemonde

Efficient Bargaining with Underutilization of Labor

P. Dehez, D. De La Croix, E. Toulemonde

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Résumé

The standard efficient contract involving a monopolistic firm and a union has always been derived under the assumption that the firm operates efficiently, i.e., it fully uses its labor force. However, nothing constrains the firm to do so and production with underutilization of labor may occur. The implications of ignoring that possibility and the conditions under which underutilization effectively occurs are studied in this paper.

langue originale	Anglais
Pages (de - à)	127-139
Nombre de pages	13
journal	Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie
Volume	69
Etat de la publication	Publié - 1 janv. 1999

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title = "Efficient Bargaining with Underutilization of Labor",

abstract = "The standard efficient contract involving a monopolistic firm and a union has always been derived under the assumption that the firm operates efficiently, i.e., it fully uses its labor force. However, nothing constrains the firm to do so and production with underutilization of labor may occur. The implications of ignoring that possibility and the conditions under which underutilization effectively occurs are studied in this paper.",

author = "P. Dehez and {De La Croix}, D. and E. Toulemonde",

year = "1999",

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JO - Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie

JF - Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie

ER -

Efficient Bargaining with Underutilization of Labor

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