Efficient Bargaining with Underutilization of Labor

P. Dehez, D. De La Croix, E. Toulemonde

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Résumé

The standard efficient contract involving a monopolistic firm and a union has always been derived under the assumption that the firm operates efficiently, i.e., it fully uses its labor force. However, nothing constrains the firm to do so and production with underutilization of labor may occur. The implications of ignoring that possibility and the conditions under which underutilization effectively occurs are studied in this paper.
langue originaleAnglais
Pages (de - à)127-139
Nombre de pages13
journalJournal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie
Volume69
Etat de la publicationPublié - 1 janv. 1999

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