Résumé
This paper explores the role of deterrence in contests. As a general rule, we show that for a deterrence strategy to be played by rational agents, it is necessary that the contest be destructive. We show for a very general class of functions that pure strategy deterrence equilibria where contestants deter one another do not exist. A corollary of this finding is that under fairly general conditions, agents should always be expected to engage in contests. Applied to international relations, our results imply that war is always a potential outcome despite deterrence attempts.
langue originale | Anglais |
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Pages (de - à) | 171-189 |
Nombre de pages | 19 |
journal | Economica |
Volume | 80 |
Numéro de publication | 317 |
Les DOIs | |
Etat de la publication | Publié - 1 janv. 2013 |