Résumé
We introduce within-group external effects in the two-sided singlehoming model of Armstrong (2006). First, we propose a general characterization of the platform access fees at the symmetric equilibrium of the game. Second, we combine this general formulation with a specific modeling of the relationship between buyers and sellers on B2C platforms, so as to analyze how changes in the underlying characteristics of the product market affect the equilibrium of the game. We show that sellers may be better off, and buyers worse off, in markets with more sellers. We also show that sellers and buyers prefer full product differentiation while platforms prefer no differentiation.
| langue originale | Anglais |
|---|---|
| Pages (de - à) | 741-751 |
| journal | Research in Economics |
| Volume | 70 |
| Numéro de publication | 4 |
| Les DOIs | |
| état | Publié - 2016 |
Empreinte digitale
Citer ceci
}
Who benefits from increased competition among sellers on B2C platforms? / Belleflamme, Paul; Toulemonde, Eric.
Dans: Research in Economics, Vol 70, Numéro 4, 2016, p. 741-751.Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal/une revue › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Who benefits from increased competition among sellers on B2C platforms?
AU - Belleflamme, Paul
AU - Toulemonde, Eric
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - We introduce within-group external effects in the two-sided singlehoming model of Armstrong (2006). First, we propose a general characterization of the platform access fees at the symmetric equilibrium of the game. Second, we combine this general formulation with a specific modeling of the relationship between buyers and sellers on B2C platforms, so as to analyze how changes in the underlying characteristics of the product market affect the equilibrium of the game. We show that sellers may be better off, and buyers worse off, in markets with more sellers. We also show that sellers and buyers prefer full product differentiation while platforms prefer no differentiation.
AB - We introduce within-group external effects in the two-sided singlehoming model of Armstrong (2006). First, we propose a general characterization of the platform access fees at the symmetric equilibrium of the game. Second, we combine this general formulation with a specific modeling of the relationship between buyers and sellers on B2C platforms, so as to analyze how changes in the underlying characteristics of the product market affect the equilibrium of the game. We show that sellers may be better off, and buyers worse off, in markets with more sellers. We also show that sellers and buyers prefer full product differentiation while platforms prefer no differentiation.
KW - E-commerce
KW - External effects
KW - Two-sided platforms
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84995407001&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.rie.2016.08.006
DO - 10.1016/j.rie.2016.08.006
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84995407001
VL - 70
SP - 741
EP - 751
JO - Research in Economics
JF - Research in Economics
SN - 1090-9443
IS - 4
ER -