Which Short-Selling Regulation is the Least Damaging to Market Efficiency? Evidence from Europe

Oscar Bernal Diaz, Ariane Szafarz, Astrid Herinckx

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal/une revueArticle

langue originaleFrançais
Pages (de - à)244-256
journalInternational Review of Law and Economics
Volume37
étatPublié - 2013

Citer ceci

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title = "Which Short-Selling Regulation is the Least Damaging to Market Efficiency? Evidence from Europe",
author = "{Bernal Diaz}, Oscar and Ariane Szafarz and Astrid Herinckx",
year = "2013",
language = "Fran{\cc}ais",
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journal = "International Review of Law and Economics",
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Which Short-Selling Regulation is the Least Damaging to Market Efficiency? Evidence from Europe. / Bernal Diaz, Oscar; Szafarz, Ariane; Herinckx, Astrid.

Dans: International Review of Law and Economics, Vol 37, 2013, p. 244-256.

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal/une revueArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - Which Short-Selling Regulation is the Least Damaging to Market Efficiency? Evidence from Europe

AU - Bernal Diaz, Oscar

AU - Szafarz, Ariane

AU - Herinckx, Astrid

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

M3 - Article

VL - 37

SP - 244

EP - 256

JO - International Review of Law and Economics

JF - International Review of Law and Economics

SN - 0144-8188

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