@article{a809ee3f8c7e41d4a530b7a587e44cdf,
title = "The tension between market shares and profit under platform competition",
abstract = "We introduce asymmetries across platforms in the linear model of competing two-sided platforms with singlehoming on both sides and fully characterize the price equilibrium. We identify market environments in which one platform has a larger market share on both sides while obtaining a lower profit than the other platform. This is compatible with higher price-cost margins on one or both sides, noting that in the latter case one margin must be negative. Our finding raises further doubts on using market shares as a measure of market power in platform markets.",
keywords = "Antitrust, Market power, Market share, Network effects, Oligopoly, Two-sided platforms",
author = "Paul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz and Eric Toulemonde",
note = "Funding Information: We are grateful for useful comments from the Editor Julian Wright and two anonymous reviewers. Paul Belleflamme and Eric Toulemonde gratefully acknowledge financial support by F{\'e}d{\'e}ration-Wallonie-Bruxelles through “Action de recherche concert{\'e}e” (Grant No. 19/24-101). Martin Peitz gratefully acknowledges financial support from Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) through CRC TR 224 (project B05). Funding Information: ? We are grateful for useful comments from the Editor Julian Wright and two anonymous reviewers. Paul Belleflamme and Eric Toulemonde gratefully acknowledge financial support by F?d?ration-Wallonie-Bruxelles through ?Action de recherche concert?e? (Grant No. 19/24-101). Martin Peitz gratefully acknowledges financial support from Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) through CRC TR 224 (project B05). Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021 Elsevier B.V.",
year = "2022",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102807",
language = "English",
volume = "81",
journal = "International Journal of Industrial Organization",
issn = "0167-7187",
publisher = "Elsevier",
}
