The tension between market shares and profit under platform competition

Paul Belleflamme, Martin Peitz, Eric Toulemonde

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal/une revueArticleRevue par des pairs


We introduce asymmetries across platforms in the linear model of competing two-sided platforms with singlehoming on both sides and fully characterize the price equilibrium. We identify market environments in which one platform has a larger market share on both sides while obtaining a lower profit than the other platform. This is compatible with higher price-cost margins on one or both sides, noting that in the latter case one margin must be negative. Our finding raises further doubts on using market shares as a measure of market power in platform markets.

langue originaleAnglais
Numéro d'article102807
journalInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
Les DOIs
Etat de la publicationPublié - mars 2022

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