Résumé
We introduce asymmetries across platforms in the linear model of competing two-sided platforms with singlehoming on both sides and fully characterize the price equilibrium. We identify market environments in which one platform has a larger market share on both sides while obtaining a lower profit than the other platform. This is compatible with higher price-cost margins on one or both sides, noting that in the latter case one margin must be negative. Our finding raises further doubts on using market shares as a measure of market power in platform markets.
langue originale | Anglais |
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Numéro d'article | 102807 |
journal | International Journal of Industrial Organization |
Volume | 81 |
Les DOIs | |
Etat de la publication | Publié - mars 2022 |
Financement
We are grateful for useful comments from the Editor Julian Wright and two anonymous reviewers. Paul Belleflamme and Eric Toulemonde gratefully acknowledge financial support by Fédération-Wallonie-Bruxelles through “Action de recherche concertée” (Grant No. 19/24-101). Martin Peitz gratefully acknowledges financial support from Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) through CRC TR 224 (project B05). ? We are grateful for useful comments from the Editor Julian Wright and two anonymous reviewers. Paul Belleflamme and Eric Toulemonde gratefully acknowledge financial support by F?d?ration-Wallonie-Bruxelles through ?Action de recherche concert?e? (Grant No. 19/24-101). Martin Peitz gratefully acknowledges financial support from Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) through CRC TR 224 (project B05).