"The Causes of Institutional Inefficiency: A Development Perspective", in Brousseau, E., and Glachant, J-M. (Eds), 2008, New Institutional Economics -A Guidebook, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 443-462.

Résultats de recherche: Contribution dans un livre/un catalogue/un rapport/dans les actes d'une conférenceChapitre

Résumé

The purpose of this contribution is to probe into the issue of inefficient institutions. Towards that end, we look at the different strands that form the so-called New Institutional Economics (NIE), and raise the question for each of them as to whether institutions can be inefficient and, if yes, for what reasons. Four economic approaches are reviewed which regard and depict institutions as the outcome of individual interactions. These are the transaction-cost approach, the principal-agent approach, the equilibrium-of-the-game approach, and the evolutionary approach.
langue originaleAnglais
titreNew Institutional Economics
Sous-titreA Guidebook
rédacteurs en chefE Brousseau
Lieu de publicationCambridge
EditeurCambridge University Press
Pages443-462
Nombre de pages20
étatNon publié - 2008

Empreinte digitale

New institutional economics
Inefficiency
Economics
Transaction costs
Interaction
Evolutionary

Citer ceci

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abstract = "The purpose of this contribution is to probe into the issue of inefficient institutions. Towards that end, we look at the different strands that form the so-called New Institutional Economics (NIE), and raise the question for each of them as to whether institutions can be inefficient and, if yes, for what reasons. Four economic approaches are reviewed which regard and depict institutions as the outcome of individual interactions. These are the transaction-cost approach, the principal-agent approach, the equilibrium-of-the-game approach, and the evolutionary approach.",
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"The Causes of Institutional Inefficiency: A Development Perspective", in Brousseau, E., and Glachant, J-M. (Eds), 2008, New Institutional Economics -A Guidebook, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 443-462. / Platteau, Jean-Philippe.

New Institutional Economics : A Guidebook. Ed. / E Brousseau. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2008. p. 443-462.

Résultats de recherche: Contribution dans un livre/un catalogue/un rapport/dans les actes d'une conférenceChapitre

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