Tax incidence on competing two-sided platforms

Paul Belleflamme, Eric Toulemonde

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal/une revueArticle

Résumé

We analyze the effects of various taxes on competing two-sided platforms. First, we consider nondiscriminating taxes. We show that specific taxes are entirely passed to the agents on the side on which they are levied; other agents and platforms are left unaffected. Transaction taxes hurt agents on both sides and benefit platforms. Ad valorem taxes are the only tax instrument that allows the tax authority to capture part of the platforms' profits. Second, regarding asymmetric taxes, we show that agents on the untaxed side benefit from the tax. At least one platform, possibly the taxed one, benefits from the tax.

langue originaleAnglais
Pages (de - à)9-21
Nombre de pages13
journalJournal of Public Economic Theory
Volume20
Numéro de publication1
Les DOIs
étatPublié - 1 févr. 2018

Empreinte digitale

tax incidence
taxes
transaction
Tax
Tax incidence
profit

Citer ceci

@article{23c0adda5ec946559b2d5118a88fd170,
title = "Tax incidence on competing two-sided platforms",
abstract = "We analyze the effects of various taxes on competing two-sided platforms. First, we consider nondiscriminating taxes. We show that specific taxes are entirely passed to the agents on the side on which they are levied; other agents and platforms are left unaffected. Transaction taxes hurt agents on both sides and benefit platforms. Ad valorem taxes are the only tax instrument that allows the tax authority to capture part of the platforms' profits. Second, regarding asymmetric taxes, we show that agents on the untaxed side benefit from the tax. At least one platform, possibly the taxed one, benefits from the tax.",
author = "Paul Belleflamme and Eric Toulemonde",
year = "2018",
month = "2",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1111/jpet.12275",
language = "English",
volume = "20",
pages = "9--21",
journal = "Journal of Public Economic Theory",
issn = "1097-3923",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "1",

}

Tax incidence on competing two-sided platforms. / Belleflamme, Paul; Toulemonde, Eric.

Dans: Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol 20, Numéro 1, 01.02.2018, p. 9-21.

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal/une revueArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - Tax incidence on competing two-sided platforms

AU - Belleflamme, Paul

AU - Toulemonde, Eric

PY - 2018/2/1

Y1 - 2018/2/1

N2 - We analyze the effects of various taxes on competing two-sided platforms. First, we consider nondiscriminating taxes. We show that specific taxes are entirely passed to the agents on the side on which they are levied; other agents and platforms are left unaffected. Transaction taxes hurt agents on both sides and benefit platforms. Ad valorem taxes are the only tax instrument that allows the tax authority to capture part of the platforms' profits. Second, regarding asymmetric taxes, we show that agents on the untaxed side benefit from the tax. At least one platform, possibly the taxed one, benefits from the tax.

AB - We analyze the effects of various taxes on competing two-sided platforms. First, we consider nondiscriminating taxes. We show that specific taxes are entirely passed to the agents on the side on which they are levied; other agents and platforms are left unaffected. Transaction taxes hurt agents on both sides and benefit platforms. Ad valorem taxes are the only tax instrument that allows the tax authority to capture part of the platforms' profits. Second, regarding asymmetric taxes, we show that agents on the untaxed side benefit from the tax. At least one platform, possibly the taxed one, benefits from the tax.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85040786582&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/jpet.12275

DO - 10.1111/jpet.12275

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85040786582

VL - 20

SP - 9

EP - 21

JO - Journal of Public Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Public Economic Theory

SN - 1097-3923

IS - 1

ER -