Résumé
In this paper we study two reverse auction formats in a single period setting, the sealed pay-as-bid and the open format, when suppliers are capacity constrained. In the pay-as-bid format we characterize the asymmetric bidding equilibrium for the case of two suppliers with uniformly distributed cost. We find that the pay-as-bid auction allocates business inefficiently and that a supplier's bid is nonincreasing in the opponent's capacity and is typically decreasing in its own capacity. We then characterize a descending price-clock open auction implementation and find that it is optimal and that the buyer's expected cost decreases as capacity is more evenly spread. Finally, we find that the pay-as-bid auction results in a higher expected cost to the buyer as compared to the open auction.
langue originale | Anglais |
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Numéro d'article | 13046 |
Pages (de - à) | 987-995 |
Nombre de pages | 9 |
journal | European Journal of Operational Research |
Volume | 247 |
Numéro de publication | 3 |
Les DOIs | |
Etat de la publication | Publié - 16 déc. 2015 |