Negative intra-group externalities in two-sided markets

Paul Belleflamme, Eric Toulemonde

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal/une revueArticle

Résumé

Two types of agents interact on a pre-existing free platform. Agents value positively the presence of agents of the other type but may value negatively the presence of agents of their own type. We ask whether a new platform can find fees and subsidies so as to divert agents from the existing platform and make a profit. We show that this might be impossible if intra-group negative externalities are sufficiently (but not too) strong with respect to positive inter-group externalities. © (2009) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
langue originaleAnglais
Pages (de - à)245-272
Nombre de pages28
journalInternational Economic Review
Volume50
Les DOIs
étatPublié - 1 févr. 2009

Empreinte digitale

Externalities
Two-sided markets
Economics
Fees
Negative externalities
Economic research
Profit
Intergroup
Subsidies

Citer ceci

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Negative intra-group externalities in two-sided markets. / Belleflamme, Paul; Toulemonde, Eric.

Dans: International Economic Review, Vol 50, 01.02.2009, p. 245-272.

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal/une revueArticle

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