Intellectual Property Rights in a Quality-Ladder Model with Persistent Leadership

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal/une revueArticle

7 Téléchargements (Pure)

Résumé

This paper analyzes the effects of intellectual property rights in a quality-ladder model of endogenous growth in which incumbent firms preemptively innovate in order to keep their position of leadership. Unlike in models with leapfrogging, granting forward pro- tection, and imposing a non-obviousness requirement reduces growth. In the main case where entrants and incumbents have free access to the same R&D technology, infinite protection against imitation, granted independently of the size of the lead, maximizes growth. If entrants have to engage in costly catch up before they can undertake frontier R&D, growth is maximal for a finite (expected) length of protection against imitation.
langue originaleAnglais
Pages (de - à)194-213
Nombre de pages18
journalEuropean Economic Review
Volume80
Les DOIs
Etat de la publicationPublié - nov. 2015

    Empreinte digitale

Contient cette citation