Elite capture through information distortion: A theoretical essay

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal/une revueArticle

Résumé

We investigate donor-beneficiary relationships in participatory development programmes, where (i) communities are heterogeneous and dominated by the local elite, (ii) the elite strategically proposes a project to the donor, knowing that the latter has imperfect knowledge of the needs of the target population. We analyse how changes in the donor's outside option or information about the needs of the target population affect elite capture. Our central, paradoxical result is that a more attractive outside option, or a higher quality of donor's information may end up encouraging the local elite to propose a project that better matches their own preference rather than the preference of the grassroots. Moreover, in the case where the noise in the donor's information follows a normal distribution, we find that a better outside option generally decreases elite capture but improved information about the needs of the target population is likely to increase elite capture.

langue originaleAnglais
Pages (de - à)250-263
Nombre de pages14
journalJournal of Development Economics
Volume106
Les DOIs
étatPublié - 1 janv. 2014

Empreinte digitale

elite
local elite
Elite capture
Information distortion
community
need
Elites
Outside options
project

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abstract = "We investigate donor-beneficiary relationships in participatory development programmes, where (i) communities are heterogeneous and dominated by the local elite, (ii) the elite strategically proposes a project to the donor, knowing that the latter has imperfect knowledge of the needs of the target population. We analyse how changes in the donor's outside option or information about the needs of the target population affect elite capture. Our central, paradoxical result is that a more attractive outside option, or a higher quality of donor's information may end up encouraging the local elite to propose a project that better matches their own preference rather than the preference of the grassroots. Moreover, in the case where the noise in the donor's information follows a normal distribution, we find that a better outside option generally decreases elite capture but improved information about the needs of the target population is likely to increase elite capture.",
keywords = "Aid effectiveness, Community-driven development, Elite capture, Information distortion, Preference targeting",
author = "Jean-Philippe Platteau and Vincent Somville and Zaki Wahhaj",
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Elite capture through information distortion : A theoretical essay. / Platteau, Jean-Philippe; Somville, Vincent; Wahhaj, Zaki.

Dans: Journal of Development Economics, Vol 106, 01.01.2014, p. 250-263.

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal/une revueArticle

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T2 - A theoretical essay

AU - Platteau, Jean-Philippe

AU - Somville, Vincent

AU - Wahhaj, Zaki

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KW - Community-driven development

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KW - Information distortion

KW - Preference targeting

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