Résumé
This paper empirically investigates the induced effect of a more and
less transparent central bank intervention (CBI) policy on market
perception and on rumors that can emerge. Using the case of the Bank
of Japan which has continued to intervene actively and
unilaterally in recent years, we estimate a dynamic-probit
model that explains the main determinants of CBI rumors in the
foreign exchange market. Two sets of determinants are clearly
identified: the first is related to the intervention strategy
adopted by the central bank (CB) for both actual
and oral interventions; the second to the uncertainty
climate of the market captured by two volatility measures.
Our results suggest that the induced effect of a transparent
CBI policy on market rumors depends on the type of
speeches made by officials: oral interventions aimed at
giving some information on the CB's point of view concerning the
exchange rate market generate speculation about the future
decisions of the CB, increasing the probability of
unrequited interventions, i.e. rumors about future
interventions. Conversely, official speeches clarifying the
current intervention policy reduce the uncertainty concerning the
occurrence of a potential intervention, decreasing the probability
of false rumors, i.e. falsely reported interventions.
langue originale | Anglais |
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Pages (de - à) | 94-111 |
Nombre de pages | 18 |
journal | Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money |
Volume | 19 |
Numéro de publication | 1 |
Etat de la publication | Publié - 2009 |