Résumé
Belgium illustrates that using consociational institutions in divided societies may ensure a peaceful political environment, but it fails in reducing its centrifugal tendencies. As communitarian issues threaten to paralyse the political debate, preserving the efficiency of the state will require adding centripetal incentives to the consociational framework. However, the solution usually proposed for this purpose - the creation of a federal constituency - would be insufficient. Instead, this paper advocates the adoption of a new electoral system: the Multiple Proportional Vote (MPV). MPV is able to maintain the consociational goal of including the different communities in the parliament, as well as to strengthen the centripetal trends towards moderation. Indeed, electors of every group are allowed to cast their preferences for candidates of the other communities. As such, MPV suggests that consociationalism and its main theoretical alternative, centripetalism, are far from mutually exclusive.
langue originale | Anglais |
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Pages (de - à) | 108-130 |
Nombre de pages | 23 |
journal | Swiss Political Science Review |
Volume | 30 |
Numéro de publication | 2 |
Les DOIs | |
Etat de la publication | Publié - juin 2024 |
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Studies from University of Namur Describe New Findings in Politics and Government (Centripetalism In Consociational Democracy: the Multiple Proportional Vote and the Belgian Case)
7/06/24
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