A welfare analysis of the principle of mutual recognition

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal/une revueArticle

Résumé

Countries set norms to protect consumers against ill-functioning products. In the absence of coordination, countries can set different norms and still achieve the same level of consumer protection. Such differences in specifications create barriers to trade because exporting firms incur adaptation costs. The principle of mutual recognition addresses the problem by ensuring that products lawfully manufactured in one country are acceptable in other countries, even without adaptation. The principle shifts the transaction costs of adapting to several norms from firms to consumers. We identify the winners and the losers, and we show that this principle is a source of disparity.

langue originaleAnglais
Pages (de - à)1-16
Nombre de pages16
journalEuropean Economic Review
Volume60
Les DOIs
étatPublié - 1 mai 2013

Empreinte digitale

Welfare analysis
Functioning
Costs
Exporting
Transaction costs
Consumer protection

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A welfare analysis of the principle of mutual recognition. / Toulemonde, Eric.

Dans: European Economic Review, Vol 60, 01.05.2013, p. 1-16.

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal/une revueArticle

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