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Literature review on the reasons for the extension of franchise

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LITERATURE REVIEW
ON THE REASON FOR THE EXTENSION OF FRANCHISE

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LITERATURE REVIEW

ON THE REASON FOR THE EXTENSION OF FRANCHISE

Abstract. *Before 1800, the right to vote was limited to only specific people. In most countries, the elites had a disproportionate influence on public affairs; franchise was mostly the privilege of the property owning males or taxpayers. After a century, that privilege was transferred to all male population in most western countries, then gradually universal suffrage has become a common norm in the world. The elites seemed to share their interests or values obtained from franchise by extending it with the citizens.*

There has been many arguments on the reason of franchise extension, that the elites were forced to do so, or they willingly granted that right. The reason was not only studied on the general view of the world perspective such as the response to the revolution threats, but also on country-specific situation like legitimacy and accountability for the governments. Undeniably, the voting right extension has constituted one of the biggest steps toward modern representative democracy. However, the expanding suffrage was originally because it would give better incentives to the elites. This literature review is to give some of those possible reasons behind the extension of franchise.

I. INTRODUCTION

Franchise (or suffrage) is the right to vote in political elections. It is defined as a right conferred or established by a government, such as the right to vote in a local or national election. In most democracies, eligible voters can vote in elections of representatives. Eligible voters are generally granted once they have reached the voting age. Other criteria for the voting eligibility depend on the government's decision. Along with the history of franchise extension, the male suffrage was granted first, the women's voting rights shortly arrived later. However, most democracies nowadays no longer extend differing rights to vote on the basis of sex, race, social status, education level, or wealth.

The concept of universal suffrage, also known as general suffrage or common suffrage, consists of the right to vote of all citizens. However, it typically does not extend the right to vote to all residents; it is usually based on citizenship, age, and occasionally mental capacity or criminal convictions. In some countries, the right to vote is even extended to resident non-citizens, for example, Commonwealth citizens can vote in the United Kingdom (retrieved from © 2016 *The Electoral Commission* dated 26 March 2017).

In many countries, voting is not only the right but also the obligation. Compulsory voting is a system in which voters are required by law to vote in elections or attend a polling place on voting day. If an eligible voter does not attend a polling place or lodge a postal vote, he or she may be subject to a penalty such as fines or community services. There are twenty-one countries currently practice compulsory suffrage (retrieved from *CIA: The World Factbook* dated 26 March 2017).

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the elites had a major influence on public affairs in most countries, voting rights were mostly for the wealthy males. During this century, most Western countries extended franchise with universal male suffrage. It was observed as a period of fundamental political reform and unprecedented changes in taxation and redistribution. As of 1900, one country (Finland in 1906) had fully universal suffrage, seventeen had universal male suffrage. More than 150 years later, during the second half of the twentieth century, universal suffrage became an irresistible norm (Przeworski, 2009).

The reasons why the narrow elites who held political rights in the form of franchise decided to extend these to citizens have been received many attentions.

First, extension of voting right was a response of the incumbent holders to revolutionary threats by the excluded. The classical explanation is the one offered by Earl Grey: “reform to preserve”. Conley and Temini (2001) also argued that extension of franchise occurs when the interests of the enfranchised and disenfranchised conflict and the disenfranchised presents a credible threat. Referring from Przeworski’s *Conquered or Granted? A History of Suffrage Extensions* (2009), he adduced Acemoglu and Robinson (2000)’s argument that when the elites face a revolution threat with a sufficient magnitude, they recognize that it would be better off making economic concessions than risking an occurrence of a revolution which would damage their properties. However, those concessions are not credible. The elites might stop implementing if the threat is temporary in some circumstances, and if the masses are not permanently organized to maintain the revolution. As the result, the disenfranchised would use the only means available to them - a revolution to reach for power, whether economic concessions are granted or not. Przeworski made a summary on the generic argument as follows: (1) Being excluded is a source of deprivation of some kind. (2) At some time, the excluded threaten to revolt. (3) Even if sharing political rights may have consequences that are costly for the incumbent elites, the elites prefer to bear these costs rather than risk a revolution. (4) Once admitted, the new citizens use their rights within the system, abandoning the insurrectionary strategy.

Second, the elites extend franchise because of exogenous changes in their evaluation of public goods. Lizzeri and Persico (2004) argued that “expanding the franchise can turn politicians away from particularistic politics based on *ad personam* redistribution within the elite and foster competition based on programs with diffuse benefits”. They presented a model of voluntary franchise extension that is based on divisions within the elites because they benefit differently from the status quo. When there is increased needs for public goods due to the rapid growth of cities, a majority of the elites require a redirection of the role of government away from special interest politics toward increased provision of the public goods. This induces the political reform to take place. This reform changes the political equilibrium from the one without public good provided for a fraction of the elites to the one that all elite members receive utility in the economy because suffrage extension is proposed to increase government spending on public goods. More specifically, Abou-Chadi and Orłowski (2013) argued that this could differently depend on the electoral system. Politicians in majoritarian system have strong incentives to design specific distributive programs targeted at relatively small societal groups in order to gain support of pivotal

groups in particular electoral districts. On the contrary, in proportional representation system, broad redistributive programs and public goods provision are most promising to ensure incumbents the support of a large share of the overall population.

Third, under the pressure of democratization in America and Europe, the spread of elections is mandatory for other governments in order to look for legitimacy and accountability from world donors and their citizens. Przeworski and Cortés (1971) as well as Freeman and Snidal (1982) developed models in which the elites are in the effort of saving the declining viability or legitimacy of the political system by franchise expanding. Paul Collier (2009) saw an end to the pursuit of power through violence. Franchise has been seen as legitimate to gain that political power. Seymour [1915, p. 447] found that “the very nature of electioneering has been transformed,” when franchise was extended, from bribing a constituency to winning it by legislation promises. Free elections is heavily promoted around the world with the expectation that they in turn will promote legitimate governments and democratic ideals.

There are also some other possibilities argued by political economists to explain the extension of franchise. One is that franchise is extended when the elites prepare for wars since the option of concessions is not credible. The elites must do that because they have to induce men to engage in fighting acts and women to take men’s place in factories (Ticchi and Vindigni, 2006). In Machiavelli’s *Discourses* (1970, Book 1, Discourse 32), he argued that governments must extend incentives to the citizens in anticipation that they would cooperated in times of adversity. Another reason is for partisan reasons if the elites are divided in order to either search for votes or look for allies to pursue their economic interests (Collier, 1999). Regarding to women’s suffrage extension, Lott and Kenny (1999) showed that it is accompanied by an expansion in public goods spending, while Kenny (2001) considered it is because of a smaller percentage of women. Przeworski (2009) argued that it seems to have resulted from electoral considerations.

This literature review is focused on the first three reasons mentioned above. It is structured as following: A history of suffrage is summarized in Section II. Section III presents analysis of theoretical reasons of franchise extension. Section IV collects some historical evidences related to Vietnam’s political situation from French colonization to the first universal suffrage in 1946. Section V gives some concluding remarks.

II. A HISTORY OF FRANCHISE EXTENSION

When first established, such as in England, the United States, France, Spain, and the newly independent Latin American republics, representative governments were not a “democracy” as we would now define the term, nor were they seen as such by their founders (Manin 1997, Dunn 2005). Representative governments were likely to be constructed by the rich, and protected from the poor. Political rights were restricted only to wealthy males. Franchise was then extended to citizens (men first, then women) in western countries, while the newly emerging countries tended to immediately grant voting rights more broadly so that political rights are now universal in almost all countries that have any kind of elections. Yet the road to mass democracy took a long time to achieve (Przeworski, 2009).

The short-lived Corsican Republic (1755-1769) was the first country to grant limited universal suffrage to all citizens over the age of twenty-five. Following with the First French Republic in 1792, it was the first country to enact suffrage for all adult males which was introduced in the Constitution of 1793 (article 4), but it was never formally enacted in practice and no elections were held under this Constitution.

During most of the nineteenth century, the voting rights were limited to male propertied adults or tax payers. They attempted to define it as “having a property, or exercising some profession, or a skill with a public title, or having an occupation in some useful pursuit, without subjection to another as a servant or day worker” (Peru in 1823); or as “exercising some useful occupation or having known means of subsistence” (Costa Rica in 1824) (Przeworski, 2009). Upon independence in this century, several Latin American countries and Liberia in Africa initially extended suffrage to all adult males, but still restricted it based on property requirements. Following the French revolutions, in Western countries in the early nineteenth century, the universal suffrage was granted focusing on removing property requirements for voting. Greece recognized male suffrage in 1830 but not extended to all free adult men until 1844 when they established first uniform suffrage requirements. France and Switzerland continuously granted the voting right to resident male citizens after the 1848 Revolution. In this late century, the democratic movements particularly in northern Europe unified liberals and social democrats using the slogan *Equal and Common Suffrage*. In the United States following the American Civil War, slaves were freed and granted rights of citizens including men’s voting rights. The country adopted full male suffrage with the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution in 1870 but this was rescinded in the South after 1890 with the reinstitution of property and literacy

requirements until the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Nohlen, 2001). In most countries, truly universal active suffrage (the right to vote but not necessarily the right to be a candidate) followed about a generation after universal male suffrage.




Figure 1 (Przeworski, 2009)

In the first modern democracies, governments restricted the vote to propertied who were a minority of the male population. In some regions, other restrictions were included, for example, some given religious requirements. Referring from Przeworski (2009), the qualifications for suffrage can be classified into several categories:

- For males,
- # Estate representation,
- # Property requirement,
- # Property or income or tax payment or exercise of some professions,
- # Property or income above some threshold or tax payment of some magnitude or exercise of some professions, *and* literacy
- # Literacy or income
- # All above some age, or with residence requirements except for those legally disqualified.

For women,

- * Qualifications applied are stricter than those of males (higher age, only relatives of military, etc)

- * Qualifications are the same as men


In countries with any kind of male suffrage, requirements of property, income or literacy were still most frequent around 1900 and more frequent than universal male suffrage until the end of World War II.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the focus of the universal suffrage movements were to include the voting rights to women. Most of countries that were pioneers in granting universal male suffrage indeed took a long time to adopt women's suffrage. In 1893, the self-governing New Zealand became the first independent nation in the world to grant truly universal active suffrage by giving women the right to vote. The Freedom in the World index lists New Zealand as the only free country in the world in that year. In 1906, Finland became the second country in the world and the first in Europe to grant universal active suffrage to its citizens and the first in the world to grant universal full suffrage (the right to both vote and be a candidate) by being the first country in the world to grant women full political rights (retrieved from website of the Finnish Parliament *Eduskunta Riksdagen*, dated 24 May 2017).

However, before that big achievement, only a proportion of women gained limited voting rights in Finland, Sweden, some Australian colonies, and some western states of United States (DuBois, 1998). In 1881, the Isle of Man gave female propertied the right to vote in the Parliament. In Australia, women were able to vote as well as stand for election in 1895 in the self-governing colony of South Australia, followed by the Commonwealth of Australia where women got the voting rights and stand in federal elections by *Commonwealth Franchise Act* 1902. After Finland, Norway was the second in Europe to grant full women's suffrage in 1913. In some other countries during that period, women could vote but on the narrower basis than that of men, such as Iceland in 1915, Canada in 1917 and the United Kingdom in 1918. Most European, Asian and African countries did not pass the women's suffrage until after World War I. In France, women could not vote until 1944, Greece until 1952 and Switzerland until 1971. Canada, the United States and Latin American countries passed the women's suffrage before World War II. Still as of 1950, only one-half of the countries granted women on the same franchise basis as men. Saudi Arabia

was the last admitted women to vote in the 2015 municipal elections (retrieved from

Proportion of countries with female suffrage, narrower and equal to males
1850-2000



© *Women Suffrage and Beyond*, dated 24th May 2017).

Figure 2 (Przeworski, 2009)

Many societies in the past have denied political rights based on race or ethnicity, related to discriminatory ideas about citizenship. In New Zealand, the Maori only have been enfranchised effectively since 1865 at the conclusion of the Maori War. Before 1919, Belgian widows were allowed to vote but lost their voting rights after remarrying. Chinese Canadians were not allowed to vote until 1947, and the same to Aboriginal Canadians until 1960, regardless of gender. In Australia, until 1962 Aboriginal people were guaranteed the voting right in Commonwealth elections. In South Africa under apartheid regime, non-white people could not vote until the first multi-party elections held one year after the Interim Constitution of 1993. Rhodesia (the name for the region that became Zimbabwe in 1980) in 1969 allowed a smaller number of representatives for the considerably larger Black majority.

By time, the number of eligible voters has increased progressively with universal suffrage, however, it does not mean that all people are granted. Some certain categories of citizens are excluded from voting rights, such as who are under a given minimum age which usually coincides with the age of majority. Worldwide minimum

voting ages are differing between countries and even within countries, though the range usually varies between sixteen and twenty-one years. Several countries impose disenfranchisement based on resident status and citizenship. Citizens who are no longer living in their countries of citizenship are not allowed to vote in some countries. For example, enrolled Australian citizens who are living abroad can not register as an overseas elector if they are not intending to return to Australia within six years. If they are not enrolled, they are ineligible to do so if they have been living overseas for more than three years (retrieved from © Australian Electoral Commission 2017, dated 24th May 2017). Danish citizens who live permanently outside the country lose their right to vote (retrieved from Act on General election, Law No. 312 of 29 March 2014, dated 24th May 2017).




Figure 3 (Przeworski, 2009)

III. THEORETICAL REASONS OF FRANCHISE EXTENSION

1. Threats of revolutions

(The following content is referred from a model of democratization by Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000 and their book "Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy", 2005)

Considering a society in which there are two groups: the elites and the citizens, nondemocracy is ruled by the narrow elites who set the policies, and democracy is ruled by the more numerous groups who constitute the majority (the citizens). Transitions to democracy typically take place when the elites controlling the existing regime extend voting rights because there are some options of other types of concessions that they would not like to try.

Generally the elites are the relatively rich and the majority is the relatively poor. The rich and the poor have conflicting preferences over policies: the rich will be opposed to redistributive taxation; whereas the poor will be in favour of taxation that would redistribute resources to them. Thus, the first option for the elites in response to unrests is to give the citizens what they want today: redistribute income and more generally adopt policies favourable to the majority. However, these promises today may not be necessarily credible tomorrow because when the threat of revolution disappears, there is no reason to do so. In order to implement a credible promise, the elites have to change the future allocation of political power by extending the franchise. Political institutions play an important role in allocating power and leading to relatively credible commitments.

The second option for the elites is repression because it allows them to maintain power without having to make any concessions to the disenfranchised. However, repression is too costly and risky because it leads to loss of lives and destruction of assets and wealth, and - depending on the international climate of opinion - it may lead to sanctions and international isolation. Once repression might fail, there could cause a revolution which the elites try to avoid the most. Hence, franchise extension is taken place when concessions are not credible and repression is not plausible.

This story of democratization as a commitment to future pro-majority policies is consistent with many historical evidences. Most transitions to democracy in the western world during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries took place when there

were social unrests and revolution threats. To quote a classic European example, Prime Minister Earl Grey in his electoral reform to the British Parliament in 1831, argued that the expanding franchise was to prevent the necessity of revolution, even though "There is no one more decided against annual parliaments, universal suffrage and the ballot than I am" (quoted in Evans 1996, p.223). Tilton (1974, pp.567-8) described the process leading to the introduction of universal male suffrage in Sweden amid strong popular pressure, "in 1866 crowds thronged around the chamber while the final vote was taken, and the 1909 reform was stimulated by a broad suffrage movement [and] a demonstration strike". Threats of revolution and social unrests were also major urges for the extension of voting rights in Latin America in the twentieth century. In Argentina, the movement toward a universal male suffrage was driven by the social unrest created by the Radical Party and the rapid radicalization of urban workers. Similarly, the establishment of franchise extension was the response to uprisings in Colombia in 1936 and in Venezuela in 1958. Such threats of social disorder occurred with the democratization in Africa (Bratton and Van der Walle, 1997) and Eastern Europe (Bunce, 2003).

Acemoglu and Robinson developed their model of democratization to explain that the franchise is extended in order to avoid the possibility of revolution. The timing of revolutions depends on one of these factors:

◆1. The poor recognize that they can be benefited from the revolution, i.e when the state of the assets they can receive is revealed. If there is a revolution, all the poor receive a per-period return in all future periods that equals to total income of the economy. A low value of the fraction of the assets which the poor can receive after the revolution means the revolution is very costly. However, if that value is equal to zero, the poor would never attempt a revolution since they will receive nothing after the revolution. A low probability of that fraction of assets obtaining its possibly maximum value means that the threat of revolution is rare, perhaps because the poor are unorganized.

◆2. The elites decide whether or not to extend the franchise. If yes, the economy becomes democracy, the poor set the tax rate. If no, the elites set the tax rate in nondemocracy.

◆3. The poor decide whether or not to initiate a revolution, assuming that once a revolution happens, it always succeeds. If yes, they share the remaining output. If no and there is franchise extension, they set the tax rate.

Continually, the model is characterized by the pure strategy Markov Perfect Equilibria of this game, in which strategies only depend on the current state of the

world and not on the entire history of the game. The state of the system consists of the current opportunity for revolution and the political state (democracy or nondemocracy). The model shows that the per-period return to each poor agent from a revolution is higher than that return if the elites neither extend the franchise nor redistribute income under the nondemocracy. Hence, the poor prefer to initiate a revolution. The elites have two strategies to prevent that threat: they are either to redistribute through taxation (and maintain political power) or to extend franchise.

If the elites choose income redistribution through taxation (i.e they set the tax rate) in order to maintain their political power, assuming that redistribution for one period only is not sufficient to prevent a revolution (i.e the per-period return that each poor agent receives from the revolution is bigger than the per-period transfer from the rich to the poor), the model shows that the redistribution continues as long as the probability of a high fraction of the assets for the poor if a revolution occurs remains. But if that state switches to nothing, the redistribution stops. This captures the discussion that the elites cannot commit to future redistribution, unless the future also poses an effective revolution threat. With the redistribution strategy, the maximum transfer that can be given to the poor without extending franchise is obtained when the elites tax themselves at the high enough rate to prevent the revolution.

Otherwise, the revolution threat will be met by franchise extension when redistribution is not sufficient to prevent that threat. In democracy, the median voters are poor agents and they set the tax rate. They want as much redistribution as possible. The model is simplified the exposition by assuming that democratizaion prevents a revolution, it means the return to the poor in democracy is bigger than the per-period return that each poor agent receives from the revolution.

There are two main conclusions drawn from this analysis:

First, even though the elites face a lower future tax burden with redistribution than that under democracy, they may prefer to extend the franchise. With the low probability of receiving the highest fraction of asset for the poor after the revolution, if the elites implement income redistribution, the poor realize that they will only receive transfers temporarily. Redistribution in that state can be viewed as a noncredible promise of future redistribution by the elites. Hence, the poor would attempt a revolution. The revolution is only prevented by franchise extension.

Second, a high probability of receiving the highest fraction of asset for the poor after the revolution makes franchise extension less likely. It corresponds to an

economy in which the poor are well organized, so they frequently pose a revolution threat, future redistribution becomes credible.

BRITAIN. In Britain, the franchise was extended in 1832 with the First Reform Act, and then again in 1867 and 1884 (and later in 1919 and 1928 when all women were finally allowed to vote). When introducing the electoral reform to the British Parliament in 1831, the Prime Minister Earl Grey explained that unless the government made changes to current political system relating to how the House of Commons was elected, Britain would be in danger of a violent revolution, and said “The Principal of my reform is to prevent the necessity of revolution” (quoted in Evans, 1983). Although the new King William IV did not totally agree with the idea of parliament reform, he feared the idea of a revolution, so he agreed to help pass the Reform Act. “The major change of the first three decades of the nineteenth century was the reform of Parliament by the 1832 Reform Act... introduced by the Whigs ... as a measure to stave off any further threat of revolution by extending the franchise to the middle classes” (wrote Darvall, 1934)

In fact, the decade prior to 1832 saw continual rioting and popular unrest, including the Luddite Riots from 1811 - 1816, the Spa Fields Riots of 1816, the Peterloo Massacre in 1819, and the Swing Riots of 1830 (Stevenson, 1979). The First Reform Act was passed in the context of rising popular discontent at the existing status quo in Britain. The Act was immediately viewed as a success, not because of some ideal of enlightenment or democracy, but because the threat of revolution and further unrest were avoided (Lee, 1994).

Before the First Reform Act, Britain was governed by the relatively rich, primarily rural aristocracy. Less than 10 percent of the adult population was allowed to vote, and policies naturally served their demands. In the beginning of 1832, the British political elites made a series of strategic concessions that were aimed at incorporating the disenfranchised into politics because the alternative was seen to be social unrest, chaos and possibly revolution. The concessions were gradual because, in 1832, social peace could be purchased by buying off the middle classes. Moreover, the effect of the concessions was diluted by the specific details of political institutions, particularly the continuing unrepresentative nature of the House of Lords (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005). At that time, the British elites did not decide to repress the disenfranchised or redistribute because: First, the problem with repression is that it is very costly. Faced with demands for democracy, political elites faced a trade-off: if they grant democracy, then they lose power over policy and faced the prospect of,

possibly radical, redistribution. On the other hand, repression risks destroying assets and wealth. Industrialization and the policy of free trade based on Britain's comparative advantages had led to an economy based on physical and increasing human capital. Such assets are easily destroyed by repression and conflict, making repression an increasingly costly option for the elites. Second, in the urbanized environment of nineteenth century Europe which Britain was 70 percent urbanized (estimated in 1867), the disenfranchised masses were relatively well organized and therefore difficult to repress. Third, capital is more difficult to redistribute, the elites found the prospect of democracy less threatening and were easier to convince to accept it. Fourth, the changes in economic and political institutions (that allowed sustained economic growth to emerge) also made democracy much less of a concern to the British elites (Aghion and Durlauf, 2005). Although there were also other factors that induced the democratization, the threat of revolution was the driving force behind the extension of franchise in Britain.

This Act removed many of the worst inequities under the old electoral system, in particular the "rotten boroughs" where several members of Parliament were elected by very few voters. It also established the right to vote based uniformly on the basis of property and income. The 1832 Reform Act increased the total electorate from 492,700 to 806,000 which represented about 14.5 percent of the adult male population. The Reform Act did not create mass democracy since the majority of British people could not vote, but it was designed as a strategic concession. Unsurprisingly, the issue of parliamentary reform was still very much alive after 1832, and it was taken up centrally by the Chartist movement as the working classes reorganized through this and later the trade unions, further concessions had to be made (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005).

The Second Reform Act was passed in 1867. One of the causes was a sharp business-cycle downturn that caused significant economic hardship and increased the threat of violence. Lee (1994, p.137) wrote: "as with the first Reform Act, the threat of violence has been seen as a significant factor in forcing the pace (of the 1867 Reform Act); history was repeating itself." The 1867 Reform Act increase the total electorate from 1.36 million to 2.48 million, and working class voters became the majority in all urban constituencies. The electorate was doubled again by the Third Reform Act of 1884, which extended the same voting regulations that already existed in the boroughs (urban constituencies) to the counties (rural constituencies). Once again, social disorder appears to have been an important factor behind the 1884 Act (Hayes, 1982). After 1884, about 60 percent of adult males were enfranchised. The Great War and its

fallout sealed the final offer of full democracy. The Representation of the People Act of 1918 gave the vote to all adult males over the age of twenty-one and women over the age of thirty who were taxpayers or married to taxpayers. Finally, all women received the vote on the same terms as men in 1928 (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005).

2. Redistributive politics

(The following content is referred from a model of redistributive politics by Lizzeri and Persico, 2004)

This model is inspired by the observation that since the end of the eighteenth century, the contemporaries felt a growing need to address the failure of political institutions both at national and local levels. Political institutions were dominated by clientelism and patronage which absorbed much of the public revenue at the expense of programs of public utility. Some politicians (like Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, or some centrist Whigs such as Lord Russell, Lord Brougham, and the leader of the Whigs Lord Grey) viewed reform as essential to reduce the pervasiveness of patronage and to coax the machinery of government to serve the public purpose. The argument is that the voluntary expansion of the franchise is accompanied by (a) more spending on public goods; (b) no greater direct transfers to the lower classes; (c) a shift in policy in a direction favoured by a majority within the elites; and (d) a change in the nature of political competition away from patronage politics. In this model, Lizzeri and Persico analyze that the effects of franchise reform is shown to be consistent with the reformers' expectations: The extension of the franchise causes a shift away from special-interest politicking toward a more public-oriented legislative activity. They discuss a model of political competition which features a tension between public goods provision and redistributive politics. The model also identifies conditions under which franchise expansion is optimal for the elite in response to an increase in the value of public goods, i.e in the opportunity cost of redistributive politics. Remarkably, the model delivers that a franchise expansion is truly voluntary. It does not require any degree of power of the disenfranchised over the elites. Lizzeri and Persico take their model as showing that there are shifts in public spending that follow the expansion of the franchise, and that these shifts may be beneficial for majority of the elites.

Considering politicians can choose a combination of two policy instruments: redistribution which is more expedient in order to favour swing voters; and a public

good with diffuse benefits. The elites may wish political reform in order to provide incentives for politicians to employ the power of office toward the provision of policies with diffuse benefits. Extending franchise (increasing the number of voters) will help reduce the fraction of the electorate who favour redistribution policy which is to favour members of the elites who are swing voters, and therefore increase the fraction of the electorate with diffuse benefits. When the number of non-swing voters (who suffer from patronage politics) exceeds 50 percent, a majority of electorate will prefer expanding the franchise with the consequent shift in policy toward public goods provision. Franchise reform hence increases in response to an exogenous increase of the value of public goods.

The model is to compare the equilibrium under restricted suffrage with the equilibrium under universal suffrage; showing that in the equilibrium under restricted suffrage, no public good is provided; whereas in the equilibrium under universal suffrage, the public good is provided. The equilibrium allocation under universal suffrage involves a Pareto improvement relative to the allocation under restricted suffrage. Considering that there are two parties in the economy want to maximize the vote share. There are two goods: money and a public good. Each citizen is endowed with one unit of money, and has linear utility for money so that his utility is 1 given consuming one unit of money. Producing public good takes all the money, and gives utility to all citizens. Therefore, a party can either promise to tax all the endowment from all citizens and to provide the public good, or promise to redistribute resources across voters by choosing ad personam taxes and transfers. The elites take one half of the population and have the right to vote. The other half is the poor and don't have the right to vote. Finally, assuming that the electoral game is sequential: First, party 1 chooses whether to promise transfers or the public good. Then party 2 observes party 1's promise and chooses whether to promise transfers or the public good. Each member of the elites observes the promise that each party make, and vote for the party which gives that member greatest utility. The policy with the majority of the votes among the elites will be implemented.

Under restricted suffrage, Party 1 does not choose the redistribution promise, since Party 2 will promise a bit more than that and win almost 100 percent vote share. Thus, Party 1 only prefer promising the public good in order to at least guarantee a non-negligible vote share. If party 2 chooses to provide the public good, it leads to a tie with party 1. In order to win a majority of the votes, then party 2 will promise redistribution. Party 2 will offer nothing to the disenfranchised (a half of population); and offer nothing to some members of the elites so that it can promise a bit more than

the value of the public good to the rest of the elites. Party 2 will win with over 50 percent of vote share.

Under universal suffrage, Party 1 promises the public good for the same reason as above. If Party 2 chooses redistribution, it can gain less than 50 percent vote share because all citizens now can vote, and so the strategic advantage of redistribution is smaller. Hence, Party 2 will choose the public good, resulting in a 50-50 split and a 0.5 probability of getting elected.

Conclusion from this analysis is that: with universal suffrage, all the elites receive the utility. Expanding the franchise is Pareto-improving for the elites. Some members are considerably better off under extension while some are indifferent. Elections with a broader franchise can give better incentives to politicians. Furthermore, any small amount of uncertainty about their position (i.e. about who will be the ones to get utility) would drive all the elites to strictly favour extension.

BRITAIN. The First Reform Act 1832 had two major components. First, it lowered the property restrictions on voting. Second, it enfranchised some large cities such as Birmingham and Manchester which previously had no representation. Thus, this act reformed the geographic as well as the socioeconomic basis for the right to vote. The act represented a shift in favour of cities and the middle classes, and it almost double the size of the voting population to approximately 800,000 people (Lizzeri and Persico, 2004).

For the second extension of the franchise, the 1867 Representation of the People Act significantly lowered the property threshold for the franchise and led to an 88 percent increase in the size of the electorate. The next change in suffrage was the 1884 Franchise Act which essentially brought household suffrage to England by extending the franchise especially in counties. At this point, about one fifth population had the right to vote (Lizzeri and Persico, 2004).

The nineteenth century saw a complete transformation of local institutions in Britain. The 1835 Municipal Corporation Act was based on the principle of one ratepayer-one vote: anyone who paid the rates (a property tax) had the right to vote. Prior to 1835, many towns were not even incorporated; the municipal corporation was run by oligarchies for the purpose of jobbery and of influencing parliamentary elections. By midcentury, almost all cities were incorporated and the municipal corporation was becoming the most important vehicle for undertaking most local public projects.

In the first half of the century, the administration of poor relief evolved in a manner that provides a sharp contrast with the gradual democratization of the parliamentary and municipal franchise. The 1818-1819 Sturges-Bourne Act and the Poor-Law Amendment Act of 1834 introduce a graduated franchise based on property: there was a minimal threshold for obtaining one vote, and wealthier individuals could cast more votes. By 1834, property owners had taken a dominant role in voting on issues related to poor-law spending.

The reforms which devoted to poor relief are to become less democratic than the reform of the franchise for institutions devoted to public spending on local infrastructure (municipal corporations). The poor-law spending declines at the same time that spending on public goods increases dramatically. The duality in the reform of franchise also suggests that the forces driving franchise reform is beyond a simple picture of redistribution, and that the destination of public spending should be taken into account.

There is also a different treatment of county and borough franchise: the extensions before 1884 are clearly in favour of cities (Davis and Tanner, 1996). It suggests a major force driving franchise reform, namely the failure of urban infrastructure to cope with the rapid inflow of immigrants from the countryside.

3. Theory of legitimacy and accountability

(This content is referred from Paul Collier, 2009 - Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in dangerous places)

The spread of democracy and elections has been heavily promoted by American and European pressure, and, as the most visible feature of democracy, they have been treated as its defining characteristic. The great political sea change may superficially have looked like the spread of democracy, but it was actually the spread of elections. There seem to be two reasons for expecting democracy to reduce the incidence of political violence: accountability and legitimacy; and they are complementary and so reinforcing. The accountability effect works as follows: In a democracy, a government has no choice but to try to deliver what ordinary citizens want. If it is seen to perform sufficiently well, then it gets reelected; if it is judged to be inferior to alternatives, then it loses. Either way, government strives to perform because it is accountable to voters. A dictator might choose to deliver performance that is just as good as this, but for the dictator it is just that, a choice. The democratic

government has no option. Democracy tends to improve government performance by subjecting leaders to the discipline of being accountable. This might in turn reduce political violence obviously because there is less basis for grievance. If the government performs better for ordinary people, then they are less likely to take up arms against it.

Regarding to legitimacy, being elected is widely seen as the only basis for government legitimacy. In turn, at least according to democratic theory, a legitimate government thereby acquires certain rights. A legitimate government has a mandate to do what it said it would do, and this entitles it to face down opposition to the implementation of its program, at least within limits. In a democracy, citizens agree to these rules, and so opposition to a government's elected program cannot legitimately extend to the use of violence. Even if the most extreme opponents of the government do not accept that the government is entitled to enact its program, they will find it more difficult to enlist mass support for violent opposition. They can no longer reasonably claim that their struggle is just. The peace-promoting benefits of democracy have become one of the fundamental certainties of the policy world, indeed perhaps one of the few unifying beliefs across the political spectrum.

It is not difficult to hold elections even in unpromising circumstances, because both political parties and voters face strong incentives to participate in them. For political parties, the incentive is that the election is the route to power. First, for the governing party, it is a fair bet that the election will consolidate power and gain legitimacy in the eyes of the donors. For opposition parties, there is at least a chance of power, and with the governing party mobilizing its supports, even if victory is unlikely, it is important to have a counter-mobilization of support, otherwise it will drain away. Second, for voters, they are satisfied from using their votes as a way of expressing their identity. And so voter turnout is likely to be particularly high where identity politics rules. Paradoxically, the less politics is about policies, the stuff of instrumental voting theories, the stronger is people's incentive to vote.

The standard approach of the international community to the end of civil war is to insist on a democratic constitution and crown this after a few years by an election. Peace will be secured by an election because the winner will be recognized as legitimate by the population, making violent opposition more difficult. Not only will the elected government be recognized as legitimate, the democratic process will ensure that it will need to be inclusive and so there will be less reason for grievance: the government will be accountable to its citizens.

IV. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE FROM VIETNAM'S FRANCHISE

1. History of Vietnam during the 1858 - 1975 period: French colonialism, Independence and Wars

Vietnam was an independent nation until French conquered during the latter half of the nineteenth century. The dynastic politics and monarchist ideology of Vietnam last about one thousand years since the first of the great Vietnamese dynasty (Ngo dynasty) was founded in 939; and ended in 1945 with the proclaim of modern Vietnamese state's independence from the imperialism. The political economy of Vietnam was changed from feudal lords to centralized hierarchical bureaucracy and matured under the last Vietnamese feudal dynasty, Nguyen dynasty (1802 - 1945). The Chinese civil service examination system was retained as the means of selecting government officials, and although at first only members of the nobility were permitted to compete in the examinations, eventually the right was extended to include most males. Like most of its neighbours, Vietnam was primarily an agricultural state, its survival based above all on the cultivation of wet rice. As in medieval Europe, much of the land was divided among powerful noble families, who often owned thousands of serfs or domestic slaves. A class of landholding farmers also existed, however, and powerful monarchs frequently attempted to protect this class by limiting the power of feudal lords and dividing up their large estates (Thrift and Forbes, 1986).

The French colonisation in Vietnam began in 1858, divided the country into three regions to administrate: the north (Tonkin), the central (Annam), and the south (Cochinchina). In 1861 France occupied Saigon, and by 1883 took control of all of Vietnam as well as Laos and Cambodia. French colonial rule was, for the most part, politically repressive and economically exploitative. Vietnamese people had almost no basic political rights under the French colonialism. New international influences had begun to transform the country's social, political, and economic environments. This occurred in both the intellectual and activist realms, in response not only to the conquest of Vietnam but also to dramatic developments in China and Japan. Vietnamese fought ferociously for and against the French conquest, and pushed for "political reforms" A generation of the country's classical-educated anti-colonialists led into nationalism and inspired a cohort of younger activists to take up the cause of

Vietnam's independence. However, the conquest itself inflicted significant material damage and human losses (Kiernan 2017).

The Japanese occupied Vietnam during World War II but allowed the French to remain and exert some influence. During World War II French rule was exercised by representatives of the Vichy regime at the sufferance of Japan until March 1945, when it was ended by a Japanese coup d'état. After Japan's surrender, the French returned to a position which the events of the war years had made irretrievable. At the revolution end in 1945, Ho Chi Minh, leader of the communist Viet Minh organization, declared Vietnam's independence in a speech that invoked the U.S. Declaration of Independence and the French Revolution's Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (from *US-Vietnam: diplomatic and political handbook*). One year later, Vietnam held a general election in which the universal suffrage was granted to its citizens. This was the first time since the French colonization, Vietnamese citizens politically had the right to vote and stand for election. This also marked the emergence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. However, the French quickly reasserted the control they had ceded to the Japanese, and the First Indochina War (1946 – 1954) was underway.

The First Indochina War broke out at the end of 1946 and ended nearly eight years later in the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. The Communists, exploiting popular opposition to the continuation of any form of foreign control, soon came to the forefront in the increasingly bitter struggle. Under a nationalist disguise within the Viet Minh - a Communist-led coalition group - they attracted the active or passive support of most of the population. French control ended on May 7, 1954, when Vietnamese forces defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu. (from *US-Vietnam: diplomatic and political handbook*). According to the official statistics published in the French Fourth Republic's *Journal officiel* in 1955, the Indochina War took some 400,000 lives. In the 1954 Geneva Conference, it was agreed that within two years, internationally supervised nationwide elections were to be held to decide a government for all of Vietnam. Vietnam had won independence, but Saigon and Hanoi fell into two separate zones (Kiernan 2017).

The North of Vietnam was ruled under Democratic Republic of Vietnam with 1960 Constitution served as a basic law of the State. Three legislative elections was held in 1960, 1964 and 1971 based on universal suffrage with the same regulation and process as being implemented in the 1960 general election. However, those legislative elections was only applied to the voters in the North because after Dien Bien Phu victory, Vietnam entered a new phase of conflict: the South of Vietnam, supported by

the United States and its allies, declined to vote “through free elections” to “seek to achieve unity” which Washington consented to the Geneva Agreements. The CIA predicted that should those elections take place, barring any missteps “the Viet Minh will almost certainly win.” President Eisenhower (1954) wrote: “possibly 80 percent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader.” In the South, Ngo Dinh Diem who was backed by the United States as the President of the South regime, proclaimed the new Republic of Vietnam, to be run by the “Government of Vietnam” on October 1955 . He attempted the Constitutional Assembly election in 1956 with limited franchise, in which he abolished villagers’ traditional right to vote in local elections for their village chiefs and councils. Ngo Dinh Diem then became the President in the 1961 presidential election with 89 percent of the votes. From 1967 to 1973, the Government of Vietnam held state-level senate elections on a wider through still limited franchise (Kiernan, 2017).

Beginning in 1958 the northern regime stepped up its efforts to subjugate the South through a well-organized campaign of subversion and terror. Eventually the United States, at South Vietnam's request, intervened to help the Saigon government repel armed aggression from the North. As a result of the Second Indochina War (1954 – 1975), Viet Cong - communist forces in South Vietnam - and regular People’s Army of Vietnam forces from the North unified Vietnam under communist rule. The North did not abide by the terms of the 1973 Paris Agreement, which officially settled the war by calling for free elections in the South and peaceful reunification. Two years after the withdrawal of the last U.S. forces in 1973, Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam, fell to the communists, and on April 30, 1975, the South Vietnamese army surrendered, marked the national unification (from *US-Vietnam: diplomatic and political handbook*). It was one of the longest wars of the twentieth century, which took the lives of citizens of twelve involved nations. A 2008 study by the BMJ (formerly *British Medical Journal*) came up with a number of three million Vietnamese-related deaths between 1955 and 1975, both soldiers and civilians. The US and its allied military deaths was estimated at some 282,000 from 1965 - 1974 (Lewy, 1978). The Republic of Vietnam in the South came to an end. The nation was united and officially renamed the Socialist Republic of Vietnam with its capital in Hanoi since 1976.

2. The extension of franchise in Vietnam during French colony was under threats of revolutions:

The decision to invade Vietnam made by Napoleon III in 1857 was the result not only of missionary propaganda, but also of the upsurge of French capitalism after 1850, which generated the need for overseas markets and the desire for a larger French share of the Asian territories conquered by the West. France's interest in Indochina grew out of its rivalry with Britain, which had excluded it from India and had effectively shut it out of other parts of mainland Southeast Asia. They desired to establish commerce in a region that promised so much untapped wealth and to redress the Vietnamese state's persecution of Catholic converts, whose welfare was a stated aim of French overseas policy (Schliesinger, 2011).

The French moved to impose a Western-style administration on their colonial territories and to open them to economic exploitation. In Vietnam, French divided into 3 regions to administrate: Cochinchina (South of Vietnam) as colony with direct administration; four protectorates of Annam (central Vietnam) were under indirect rule and Tonkin (North of Vietnam). All under governor general with headquarter in Cochinchina and resident superior in capitals of four protectorates. A system of civil service was developed: French on top, then Vietnamese bureaucrats and Vietnamese educated as minor officials. All important positions within the bureaucracy were staffed with officials imported from France; even in 1930s after several periods of reforms and concessions to local nationalist movement, Vietnamese officials were employed only in minor positions and at very low salaries, and the country was still administered along the lines laid down by Doumer (Chandler, 2017).

The Vietnamese had no freedom and were not allowed to travel outside their districts without identification papers. They were not allowed to publish any books without French censorship (Clayton, 1994). Two other aspects of French colonial policy are significant when considering the attitude of the Vietnamese people, especially their educated minority, toward the colonial regime: one was the absence of any kind of civil liberties for the native population, and the other was the exclusion of the Vietnamese from the modern sector of the economy, especially industry and trade. Not only were rubber plantations, mines, and industrial enterprises in foreign hands - French, where the business was substantial, and Chinese at the lower levels - but all other business was as well, from local trade to the great export-import houses. The social consequence of this policy was that, apart from the landlords, no property-owning indigenous middle class developed in colonial Vietnam. Thus, capitalism

appeared to the Vietnamese to be a part of foreign rule; this view, together with the lack of any Vietnamese participation in government, profoundly influenced the nature and orientation of the national resistance movements (Chandler, 2017).

The main characteristic of the national movement during the first phase of resistance, however, was its political orientation toward the past. Filled with ideas of precolonial Vietnam, its leaders wanted to be rid of the French in order to reestablish the old imperial order. Because this aspiration had little meaning for the generation that came to maturity after 1900, this first stage of anti-colonial resistance did not survive the death of its leaders. A new national movement rose in the early twentieth century. Mass demonstrations demanding a reduction of high taxes took place in many cities in 1908. After World War I, the movement for national liberation intensified. A number of prominent intellectuals sought to achieve reforms by obtaining political concessions from the colonial regime through collaboration with the French. The failure of such reformist efforts led to a revival of clandestine and revolutionary groups, especially Annam and Tonkin; among these was the Vietnamese Nationalist Party (VNQDD), founded in 1927 (Hosch, 2010).

The French, under these unrest pressure, were attempting political reforms as a concession toward social disorders. The franchise extension in 1922 was an evidence of their effort preceded by various movements by Vietnamese. Among of that was an anti-Chinese boycott targeting the grip on Cochinchina's commerce of Chinese Saigon-Chợ Lớn businesses in 1919, in order to call for electoral reforms, to raise the number of Vietnamese eligible to vote in elections for the Colonial Council of Cochinchina (which could ratify or reject budgets proposed by the colony's governor) and to raise the number of council seats set aside for Vietnamese members. Of Cochinchina's population of about 3.8 million, only 1,800 Vietnamese were eligible to vote in the elections of 1920, meaning that only 0.05 percent of population which was negligible could vote. The intense uprisings forced the authorities to widen the franchise to ten times of voters accounting for 0.5 percent of population, including those landowners and businessmen who paid certain levels of taxation, officeholders of various levels, high school graduates, and decorated war veterans (Kiernan, 2017).

In 1924, a new governor-general was sent to French Indochina, Alexandre Varenne – a moderate socialist. He faced the increasing threat of losing control of Vietnamese politics with upsurge of local activism and nationwide protest provoked by colonial injustice and material deprivation. One of nationalist was Nguyen Phan Long forced Varenne to implement basic civil liberties; to expand educational opportunities, administrative and judicial reforms, greater Vietnamese representation

in government, extension to Indochina of French labor legislation, and suppression of the alcohol monopoly (Taylor, 2013). Varenne thereafter granted some amnesties, and he offered the people of Indochina including the Vietnamese a few additional civil liberties. By 1939 Cochinchina's bureaucracy included at least 159 Vietnamese in its cadre supérieur of officials, twenty of them at the top administrative grade. Yet before 1945 the French promoted few Vietnamese even to the level of province chief. The colonial army of Indochina had only about fifty Indochinese in its 1,400-strong officer corps. The next year, Constitutionals summed up their demands as educational expansion, judicial reform, increased access to French citizenship, and a representative political body with a wider franchise (Kiernan, 2017). Comparing with the political situation under Gov.-Gen. Paul Doumer in 1897 in which French rule was imposed directly at all levels of administration, leaving the Vietnamese bureaucracy without any real power, the early of twentieth century observed some big concessions of French in term of extending franchise. However, like the moderate socialists in power in Germany, Varenne began his administration without attempting fundamental changes. After 1936, the Vietnamese Communist Party (formed late 1930) skilful exploited all opportunities for the creation of legal front organizations, through which it extended its influence among intellectuals, workers and peasants. When the Japanese surrendered in August 1945, this party was able to seize power in the North of Vietnam, and newly proclaimed the independence.

3. The first universal suffrage in 1946 for legitimacy and accountability of Democratic Republic of Vietnam

In August 1945, hours after Japan's surrender in World War II, the Viet Minh led by Ho Chi Minh succeeded in taking power from the capitulating Japanese army in Indochina, despite the presence of the French colonialist regime that had surrendered to the Japanese army in 1939. The Viet Minh took power over all of Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh declared the independence of Vietnam from France, that marked the beginning of the collapse of the French colonization after almost 80 years in Vietnam. He chose the Rule of Law-based democratic republic, not the dictatorship of the proletariat, as the appropriate political regime under the political circumstances of Vietnam (Hoang Tung, 1988).

However, Democratic Republic of Vietnam was not legitimated by any governments in the world. The universal franchise was discussed as an urgent

requirement to in order to “establish officially the Congress and elect the Government” (No 23-SL Act by Ho Chi Minh, 1945) one day after the declaration of the Republic, on September 3, 1945. Ho Chi Minh convened the first session of the Interim Government and suggested the six most urgent tasks of the DRV, one of which was to have a democratic constitution through a suffrage. Considering a universal suffrage as the only option for legitimate government, spoken in the first meeting of the interim government, Ho Chi Minh emphasized: “As we were formerly ruled by the absolute monarchy, then the colonial regime which was no less despotic, our country had no constitution and our people could not enjoy democratic freedoms. Therefore, I propose the Government to organize as soon as possible a general election according to the universal suffrage regime.” (cited from *The Urgent Tasks of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam*, Ho Chi Minh’s Entire Collection). Collier (2009) once wrote: “Elections usually produce legitimate governments.”

No. 51-SL Act by Ho Chi Minh (1945) stated that: “All citizens, male and female, aged full 18 years old shall have the right to vote and to stand for the election, regardless of their economic situation, religion, ethnicity.” This was not only applied to Vietnamese but also to expatriates whose naturalization submission to the citizenship of Vietnam were accepted by provincial People’s Committee. On January 6, 1946, the first universal suffrage general election was held to elect the National Assembly, the supreme organ power of new Vietnam, with nominees from different political parties, including anti-communist parties. A multiparty parliament, the Peoples Parliament, was elected and it appointed a multiparty government to administer the country. Approximately 89 percent of eligible voters implemented their right. In some regions, the elections were opposed by the French colonial authorities and their supporters, and were marked by bombings and misinformation, which led to the lower percentage of electorate votes accounting for 65 - 75 percent (Truong Dac Linh, 2008). For the majority of voters, after 80 years under French colony without any political rights, this was the first time they had this right, and used it as the way of expressing their identities. This explains why the voter turnout was high in an extremely difficult situation, including preventing trials of Chinese force in the North, French force in the South; remaining casualties of 1945 great famine or 90 percent of population illiterate.

In November 1946, the National Assembly adopted the first Constitution of the Republic. The 1946 Constitution clearly pointed out that “Vietnam is an indivisible and monolithic bloc; it is a democratic republic, power belongs to the whole Vietnamese people irrespective of race, gender, property, social class and

religion.” (from *Study on Ho Chi Minh's Ideology on State and Law*, Nguyen Dinh Loc). The second chapter stipulates the obligations and rights of the citizens, under which all citizens are equal before the law and have equal political, economic and cultural rights. The interests of both the intellectual and the manual worker are protected. Women have rights equal to those of men in all respects. Vietnamese citizens have freedom of speech, publication, association and meeting; the right to free choice of residence; free emigration within or outside the country; and free compulsory primary education. The people have the right to a general, free, direct and confidential vote, as well as the right to referendum on matters vital to the country or amendment to the Constitution. No seizure or detention is allowed without a judicial decision; no invasion of house and correspondence is permitted without stipulation by law. Private ownership is guaranteed. (cited from *Rule of Law in Vietnam: Theory and Practice*, Truong Trong Nghia, 2000).

Moreover, the newly born Vietnamese government faced a series of threats to be overthrown by imperial powers and their henchmen. Under the reasons to receive the surrender of Japanese forces, British, French, Chinese and the leftover Japanese soldiers started to invade, aimed to established a new government which was favoured to imperialist governments. The universal suffrage was the way to gain accountability of the Vietnam government, in order to lead all the population in incorporating for the forthcoming war.

The leaders of new Vietnamese state was well acknowledged that a suffrage to share this political rights among citizens was not only to proclaim the independence, but also to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the world. Vietnam's first franchise was also a universal one to all citizens, it was the form and extent of early globalisation since Ho Chi Minh, an advanced intellectual had achieved knowledge and learned from the Western systems, then applied to the newly born state in Vietnam.

V. CONCLUSION

This literature review has offered three of many reasons behind the extension of franchise. Using a model of democratization by Acemoglu and Robinson, it is explained that expanding franchise is the best response of the elites to the threat of revolution. The story of Vietnam franchise extension under French colony have contributed as an empirical evidence to this analyses. The other option of redistribution is not sufficient and credible enough to prevent that threat happen. Lizzeri and Persico in their model of redistributive politics gives a different dimension on the cause of universal suffrage, in which the elites are not forced to do so. In contrast, they willing grant the voting rights to citizens as an optimal solution for their better incentives of public goods. Those two models are consolidated by evidence of franchise history of Britain, one of the earliest representative democracies in the western world. The last reason mentioned in this review is a recent approach by Collier, in which the newly modern democracies are more likely to be resulted from requirements of legitimacy and accountability. The birth of Democratic Republic of Vietnam by its first universal suffrage is an example of this theory.

The story of democratization is the history of disenfranchised fighting for their political rights and of enfranchised in their effort of consolidating their political powers and economic benefits. Nowadays, universal suffrage has become an irresistible norm, and one of the basic people's rights in most of the countries. Studying various reasons of the establishments of democracy is not only to avoid political violence but also to enhance its genuine values. In his study of top bottom billion, Collier found that a more democratic polity does not necessarily make peace more likely. This is an important contribution to politicians in granting voting rights to citizens as well as in building policies: once democracy is promoted to serve minority's benefits, and elections are the mean to legitimate those benefits, the long-lived peace is hardly to be settled. "Yet a proper democracy does not merely have competitive elections; it also has rules for the conduct of those elections: cheating gets punished. A proper democracy also has checks and balances that limit the power of a government once elected: it cannot crush the defeated" (Collier, 2009).

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