The tension between market shares and profit under platform competition

Paul Belleflamme, Martin Peitz, Eric Toulemonde

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We introduce asymmetries across platforms in the linear model of competing two-sided platforms with singlehoming on both sides and fully characterize the price equilibrium. We identify market environments in which one platform has a larger market share on both sides while obtaining a lower profit than the other platform. This is compatible with higher price-cost margins on one or both sides, noting that in the latter case one margin must be negative. Our finding raises further doubts on using market shares as a measure of market power in platform markets.

Original languageEnglish
Article number102807
JournalInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2022


  • Antitrust
  • Market power
  • Market share
  • Network effects
  • Oligopoly
  • Two-sided platforms


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