We open this paper by explicating the content of Laplace's myth , which we construe as an inference resting on the conjunction of two premises, the hypothesis of an unlimited intelligence and the hypothesis of an ontologically deterministic universe, and leading to the thesis of epistemological determinism. We then aim at showing that such an inference is not valid. To this purpose, we seek for a particular metaphysical framework within which it is possible to hold the conjunction of the premises of the Laplacean inference together with the negation of its conclusion. In particular, after having assessed - and then discarded - the possibility that Bergsonism be a suitable framework to this effect, we show that a specific philosophy of evolution, which has been influenced by - but also took its distance with regard to - Bergsonism, turns out to be the required framework. Emphasising the existence as well as the very consistence of this philosophy is the occasion for putting an end to Laplace's myth.