Productive inefficiency in extended agricultural households: Evidence from Mali

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

In Sub-Saharan African farm households, two types of plot management often coexist: collective fields are farmed jointly by household members under the authority of the head while individual plots are autonomously managed by members. In this paper we explore the productivity differentials between collective and individual plots in the context of extended family farms. We find that land yields are significantly larger on male private plots than on common plots after all appropriate controls have been included. Yet, the disadvantage of common plots exists only for care intensive crops and for cash crops. We provide evidence that the yield differentials stem from labor incentive problems. They may arise from the prevailing reward function and/or from preference heterogeneity over the use of the proceeds from the collective field.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)17-27
Number of pages11
JournalJournal of Development Economics
Volume116
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2015

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Mali
farm
family farm
extended family
evidence
reward
incentive
labor
productivity
crop
management
household
Agricultural households
Crops
Inefficiency
land
cash crop
type of management
Household
Disadvantage

Keywords

  • Family structure
  • Labor incentives
  • Land productivity

Cite this

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title = "Productive inefficiency in extended agricultural households: Evidence from Mali",
abstract = "In Sub-Saharan African farm households, two types of plot management often coexist: collective fields are farmed jointly by household members under the authority of the head while individual plots are autonomously managed by members. In this paper we explore the productivity differentials between collective and individual plots in the context of extended family farms. We find that land yields are significantly larger on male private plots than on common plots after all appropriate controls have been included. Yet, the disadvantage of common plots exists only for care intensive crops and for cash crops. We provide evidence that the yield differentials stem from labor incentive problems. They may arise from the prevailing reward function and/or from preference heterogeneity over the use of the proceeds from the collective field.",
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author = "Catherine Guirkinger and Platteau, {Jean Philippe} and Tatiana Goetghebuer",
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AU - Goetghebuer, Tatiana

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N2 - In Sub-Saharan African farm households, two types of plot management often coexist: collective fields are farmed jointly by household members under the authority of the head while individual plots are autonomously managed by members. In this paper we explore the productivity differentials between collective and individual plots in the context of extended family farms. We find that land yields are significantly larger on male private plots than on common plots after all appropriate controls have been included. Yet, the disadvantage of common plots exists only for care intensive crops and for cash crops. We provide evidence that the yield differentials stem from labor incentive problems. They may arise from the prevailing reward function and/or from preference heterogeneity over the use of the proceeds from the collective field.

AB - In Sub-Saharan African farm households, two types of plot management often coexist: collective fields are farmed jointly by household members under the authority of the head while individual plots are autonomously managed by members. In this paper we explore the productivity differentials between collective and individual plots in the context of extended family farms. We find that land yields are significantly larger on male private plots than on common plots after all appropriate controls have been included. Yet, the disadvantage of common plots exists only for care intensive crops and for cash crops. We provide evidence that the yield differentials stem from labor incentive problems. They may arise from the prevailing reward function and/or from preference heterogeneity over the use of the proceeds from the collective field.

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