Abstract
Once one rejects the interactionist dualism as a theory of the mind, the concept of quale yields a contradiction. Qua phenomenal data of consciousness it refers to an intrinsic property not explainable in terms of the natural sciences; qua data of subjective experience a quale is for the subject and must therefore be functionally efficient. In order to shun this paradox Daniel Dennett suggests challenging our intuitions concerning consciousness and setting up a new explanatory frame that would make it possible to develop a theory without the concept of quale. Though the model defended by Dennett presents several difficulties it interestingly represents an invitation to review the language-games we use to conceive consciousness.
Translated title of the contribution | Consciousness imagined on eliminativism according to Daniel Dennett |
---|---|
Original language | French |
Pages (from-to) | 761-782 |
Number of pages | 22 |
Journal | Revue philosophique de Louvain |
Volume | 98 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2000 |
Externally published | Yes |