Gender, Social Norms and Household Production in Burkina Faso

H. Kazianga, Zaki Wahhaj

Research output: Working paper

Abstract

Using a survey of agricultural households in Burkina Faso, we provide evidence that plots owned by the head of the household is farmed much more intensively than plots, with similar characteristics and planted to the same crops, owned by other household members (of both genders). As in previous studies, this evidence is inconsistent with the assumption of Pareto efficiency in household decisions, but additionally suggests that status within the household rather than gender per se may be the most important factor in determining the allocation of productive resources within the household. We argue that the higher yields achieved by the household head may be explained in terms of social norms that require him to spend the earnings from some farms under his control exclusively on household public goods, as has been observed in the anthropological literature on this region.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusPublished - 2007

Fingerprint

Household
Household production
Social norms
Burkina Faso
Resources
Farm
Agricultural households
Factors
Crops
Pareto efficiency

Cite this

@techreport{01a24d6a51af4d42a4698636b3b2c693,
title = "Gender, Social Norms and Household Production in Burkina Faso",
abstract = "Using a survey of agricultural households in Burkina Faso, we provide evidence that plots owned by the head of the household is farmed much more intensively than plots, with similar characteristics and planted to the same crops, owned by other household members (of both genders). As in previous studies, this evidence is inconsistent with the assumption of Pareto efficiency in household decisions, but additionally suggests that status within the household rather than gender per se may be the most important factor in determining the allocation of productive resources within the household. We argue that the higher yields achieved by the household head may be explained in terms of social norms that require him to spend the earnings from some farms under his control exclusively on household public goods, as has been observed in the anthropological literature on this region.",
author = "H. Kazianga and Zaki Wahhaj",
year = "2007",
language = "English",
type = "WorkingPaper",

}

Gender, Social Norms and Household Production in Burkina Faso. / Kazianga, H.; Wahhaj, Zaki.

2007.

Research output: Working paper

TY - UNPB

T1 - Gender, Social Norms and Household Production in Burkina Faso

AU - Kazianga, H.

AU - Wahhaj, Zaki

PY - 2007

Y1 - 2007

N2 - Using a survey of agricultural households in Burkina Faso, we provide evidence that plots owned by the head of the household is farmed much more intensively than plots, with similar characteristics and planted to the same crops, owned by other household members (of both genders). As in previous studies, this evidence is inconsistent with the assumption of Pareto efficiency in household decisions, but additionally suggests that status within the household rather than gender per se may be the most important factor in determining the allocation of productive resources within the household. We argue that the higher yields achieved by the household head may be explained in terms of social norms that require him to spend the earnings from some farms under his control exclusively on household public goods, as has been observed in the anthropological literature on this region.

AB - Using a survey of agricultural households in Burkina Faso, we provide evidence that plots owned by the head of the household is farmed much more intensively than plots, with similar characteristics and planted to the same crops, owned by other household members (of both genders). As in previous studies, this evidence is inconsistent with the assumption of Pareto efficiency in household decisions, but additionally suggests that status within the household rather than gender per se may be the most important factor in determining the allocation of productive resources within the household. We argue that the higher yields achieved by the household head may be explained in terms of social norms that require him to spend the earnings from some farms under his control exclusively on household public goods, as has been observed in the anthropological literature on this region.

M3 - Working paper

BT - Gender, Social Norms and Household Production in Burkina Faso

ER -