TY - JOUR
T1 - Economic Dependence and Data Access
AU - Tombal, Thomas
N1 - Funding Information:
The author would like to thank Prof. Dr. Alexandre de Streel, Prof. Dr. Reto M Hilty, Dr. Inge Graef, Dr. Bertin Martens and the participants to the ?Third Workshop for Junior Researchers in IP law? organised at Sciences Po Law School on 20?21 June 2019 (in particular Thomas Verdonk), for their valuable comments on the draft versions of this article. The author would also like to thank BELSPO, the Belgian Federal Science Policy office, for their financial aid, according to the agreement of subsidy No. [BR/154/A4/FLEXPUB].
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich.
Copyright:
Copyright 2019 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - Traditionally, according to EU competition law, if an undertaking holding a dominant position refuses to grant access to its data to another undertaking, this could potentially lead to an abuse precluded by Art. 102 TFEU. However, the scope of this provision is limited as it only applies to dominant undertakings. Yet, powerful data holders that do not benefit from such a dominant position might start refusing to provide access to their data to undertakings with limited bargaining power. This is notably illustrated by two cases in the USA, namely PeopleBrowsr v. Twitter and hiQ v. LinkedIn. These two cases raise the question of whether the concept of abuse of economic dependence could prove to be a valuable alternative in order to deal with refusals, by non-dominant undertakings, to provide access to data to undertakings with a weaker bargaining power. In this article, the rationale for data access and sharing in light of the data’s characteristics will first be briefly outlined. Then, the conditions of the abuse of economic dependence will be identified by relying on Belgian, German and French law. On these grounds, the article will question whether a refusal to provide access to data could qualify as an abuse of economic dependence.
AB - Traditionally, according to EU competition law, if an undertaking holding a dominant position refuses to grant access to its data to another undertaking, this could potentially lead to an abuse precluded by Art. 102 TFEU. However, the scope of this provision is limited as it only applies to dominant undertakings. Yet, powerful data holders that do not benefit from such a dominant position might start refusing to provide access to their data to undertakings with limited bargaining power. This is notably illustrated by two cases in the USA, namely PeopleBrowsr v. Twitter and hiQ v. LinkedIn. These two cases raise the question of whether the concept of abuse of economic dependence could prove to be a valuable alternative in order to deal with refusals, by non-dominant undertakings, to provide access to data to undertakings with a weaker bargaining power. In this article, the rationale for data access and sharing in light of the data’s characteristics will first be briefly outlined. Then, the conditions of the abuse of economic dependence will be identified by relying on Belgian, German and French law. On these grounds, the article will question whether a refusal to provide access to data could qualify as an abuse of economic dependence.
KW - Data access
KW - Data sharing economy
KW - Economic dependence
KW - Relative market power
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85076289355&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s40319-019-00891-0
DO - 10.1007/s40319-019-00891-0
M3 - Article
SN - 2195-0237
VL - 51
SP - 70
EP - 98
JO - International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law
JF - International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law
IS - 1
ER -