Criteria to compare mechanisms that partially satisfy a property: an axiomatic study

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Abstract

We study criteria that compare mechanisms according to a property (e.g., Pareto efficiency or stability) in the presence of multiple equilibria. The multiplicity of equilibria complicates such comparisons when some equilibria satisfy the property while others do not. We axiomatically characterize three criteria. The first criterion is intuitive and based on highly compelling axioms, but is also very incomplete and not very workable. The other two criteria extend the comparisons made by the first and are more workable. Our results reveal the additional robustness axiom characterizing each of these two criteria.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)835-862
Number of pages28
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume58
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2022

Funding

We are very grateful to Martin Van der Linden for helpful comments and suggestions. We thank John Weymark who commented on a preliminary version of this work. We are grateful to one anonymous referee, one anonymous co-editor and the editor for suggestions that greatly helped improve the paper. We thank all the participants to the DEFIPP workshop and the 13th Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare for valuable comments and discussions. All remaining mistakes are of course ours.

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