Abstract
We study criteria that compare mechanisms according to a property (e.g., Pareto efficiency or stability) in the presence of multiple equilibria. The multiplicity of equilibria complicates such comparisons when some equilibria satisfy the property while others do not. We axiomatically characterize three criteria. The first criterion is intuitive and based on highly compelling axioms, but is also very incomplete and not very workable. The other two criteria extend the comparisons made by the first and are more workable. Our results reveal the additional robustness axiom characterizing each of these two criteria.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 835-862 |
Number of pages | 28 |
Journal | Social Choice and Welfare |
Volume | 58 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - May 2022 |
Funding
We are very grateful to Martin Van der Linden for helpful comments and suggestions. We thank John Weymark who commented on a preliminary version of this work. We are grateful to one anonymous referee, one anonymous co-editor and the editor for suggestions that greatly helped improve the paper. We thank all the participants to the DEFIPP workshop and the 13th Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare for valuable comments and discussions. All remaining mistakes are of course ours.
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Essays on Mechanism Design and Family Economics
Woitrin, F. (Author), BALAND, J.-M. (Supervisor), Cassan, G. (Co-Supervisor), Trimarchi, L. (President), Anderson, S. (Jury), Rossi, P. (Jury) & Gobbi, P. (Jury), 13 Sept 2023Student thesis: Doc types › Doctor of Economics and Business Management
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