Corporate lobbying and firm performance variability

Alexandre Girard, Jean-Yves Gnabo, Rodrigo Londoño van Rutten

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper is the first to provide empirical evidence that higher lobbying expenditures are associated with higher operational performance variability. Using data from S&P1500 firms over the 2000–2020 period, our estimates indicate a positive relationship between lobbying expenditures and the variability of return on asset and return on equity. Addressing the endogeneity concerns by applying a control function approach, we find results consistent with the view that the management of lobbying firms takes riskier investment decisions.

Original languageEnglish
Article number104524
JournalFinance Research Letters
Volume58
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2023

Keywords

  • Firm performance variability
  • Firm performance volatility
  • Lobbying
  • Moral hazard

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Corporate lobbying and firm performance variability'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this